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1. Introduction 
At the heart of Rawlsian political liberalism is its ‘ideal of public reason’. As 
standardly understood, this ideal concerns the way in which democratic deliberation 
is to be conducted when fundamental political matters are at stake (what Rawls calls 
‘constitutional essentials’ and ‘questions of basic justice’), and requires that citizens 
justify their decisions regarding those matters in terms that each can reasonably accept. 
More precisely put, the ideal requires citizens to bracket their reasonable 
disagreements over religion, metaphysics, and the other elements of their rival 
‘comprehensive doctrines’, and instead adduce justifications framed entirely in terms 
of a special set of ‘political values’ - values that all reasonable citizens can be expected 
to recognise, irrespective of their comprehensive doctrinal commitments, and that 
therefore provide each with properly public reasons.1  Political liberalism holds citizens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This description of the ideal skirts around what Rawls (2005, p. liii) calls the ‘wide view’ of public 
reason, whereby citizens may freely appeal to their comprehensive doctrines, subject to the proviso 
that they be able to produce, in due course, sufficient public reasons to yield the same conclusion. 
Because public reasons must be forthcoming at some point, neither the ‘incompleteness objection’ to 	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to be under a (non-enforceable) moral ‘duty of civility’ to conform to the ideal of 
public reason, thus construed, and abstain from supporting resolutions to 
fundamental political questions whose justifications necessarily rest on 
comprehensive (and hence ‘sectarian’) considerations. In so acting, Rawlsians claim, 
citizens respect each other’s freedom and equality, provide assurance of their 
commitment to liberal-democratic principles, and realise the value of reciprocity in 
their political relations. 
A recurring objection to the foregoing ideal avers that Rawlsian public reason 
is incomplete, in the sense that it excludes from democratic deliberation moral and 
other philosophical ideas without which citizens will be unable to properly debate or 
resolve a variety of problems concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice 
(see, e.g., Dworkin 2006, pp. 253-4; Greenawalt 1988, ch.s 6-8; de Marneffe 1994; 
Quinn 1995; Reidy 2000; Sandel 1989). The example of such a problem most 
frequently cited by the objection’s proponents is that of abortion. To decide whether 
and how far abortion should be legally available, it is standardly assumed, we must 
first determine the moral status the fetus through pregnancy. According to 
proponents of the incompleteness objection, however, citizens conforming to 
Rawls’s duty of civility cannot do so. 
In making this claim, critics of political liberalism dispute Rawls’s own story 
about how public reasoning on the subject of abortion would go. In a footnote in 
Political Liberalism which many subsequent authors have found frustratingly brief and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which I presently turn in the text, nor the argument of this paper, is affected by Rawls’s endorsement 
of the wide view, which I therefore leave aside throughout. 
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cryptic (Rawls 2005, p. 243 n32; see also Rawls 2001, p. 117), Rawls stated that the 
political values upon which public reasoning is based include what he called ‘the due 
respect for human life’. And he suggested that, within public reason, citizens would 
be able to more closely interpret the demands of that value, weighing them against 
the demands of competing values, such as the equality of women, to arrive at fairly 
fine-grained judgements concerning the range of circumstances under which abortion 
should be permitted. Advocates of the incompleteness objection typically grant - or at 
least do not deny - that respect for human life is a political value that can be affirmed 
by all reasonable citizens. They do not, then, claim that public reason requires citizens 
to remain entirely mute over prenatal moral status. They do insist, however, that the 
idea of respect for human life will prove too vague and insubstantial to enable 
citizens to reach firm conclusions regarding the permissibility of abortion, unless or 
until it is given further content, drawn from citizens’ inadmissible comprehensive 
doctrines. 
This paper provides a new analysis and critique of Rawlsian public reason’s 
handling of the abortion question that takes the foregoing incompleteness objection 
as its point of departure, but is importantly distinct from it. I defend two key claims. 
The first is that Rawlsian public reason, when the restrictions on its content are fully 
laid out, requires greater argumentative restraint from citizens debating abortion than 
Rawlsians or their critics have hitherto acknowledged. As specified by Rawls, I argue, 
and as understood by Rawlsian reasonable citizens, the political values of public 
reason enjoin respect only for persons. Therefore, beyond confirming the preliminary 
point that fetuses do not qualify as persons under political liberalism’s ‘political 
conception of the person’, public reasoning about prenatal moral status completely 
‘runs out’, as the literature sometimes puts it – there is nothing further that it can say. 
4 
Put differently, since persons represent only a subset of human life, the value of 
respect for human life that Rawls identifies is not (when distinguished from the 
narrower idea of respect for political persons) a bona fide political value at all. Hence, 
the interpretation of that value and its moral implications is not within the remit of 
public reason. 
Importantly, however - and this is my second key claim – this gap in the 
content of public reason does not threaten deliberators’ abilities to decide how far 
abortion should be available in their society. On the contrary, precisely because public 
reason strikes out any fetus-regarding normative concerns that might weigh against 
the interests of women in controlling their bodies and fertility, it has radically 
permissive implications for the legal regulation of feticide, inclining heavily towards 
the view that abortion should be allowed with little or no qualification, right until 
birth. I end by providing grounds for thinking that the argumentative restraint which 
Rawlsian public reason enjoins over prenatal moral status is objectionable, even if it 
does not cause indeterminacy on the question of abortion. It lies beyond the paper’s 
scope, however, to establish whether the abandonment of political liberalism is 
consequently justified on balance. 
In making my case, I aim to make progress in a debate between political 
liberals and their opponents that has long been stuck at a frustrating impasse. As 
political liberals have been keen to point out, those who object that Rawlsian public 
reasoning will struggle to resolve the moral status of the fetus, and thus the legal 
status of abortion, have tended to go little further than to state their suspicion or 
intuition that their objection is correct. But conversely, rather than explaining to the 
perplexed how, despite its heavily restricted content, public reason can indeed 
successfully grapple with these issues, political liberals typically only assert that it can 
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do so, and/or insist that the onus is on sceptics to prove otherwise.2 Hence, both 
sides seem vulnerable to the charge of begging the question against each other. In a 
recent survey of the state of the debate over Rawlsian public reason, Jonathan Quong 
(2013a, p. 278) rightly observes that, if they are to make their case more conclusively 
in future, both those who affirm and those who dispute public reason’s power to 
resolve complex moral problems will have to engage in close, case-by-case analysis of 
particular issues, isolating the public reasons relevant to them, and evaluating how 
much work these can do in enabling citizens to draw appropriate conclusions. This 
paper makes a start on that overdue task.  
Before I begin, three important points of terminology. First, my arguments 
are directed not at public reason liberalism generally, but at its mainstream Rawlsian 
variant specifically. I put aside the rival ‘convergence conception’ of public reason, 
developed by Gerald Gaus (2011) and Kevin Vallier (2014), and various revisionist 
political liberalisms, such as that of Martha Nussbaum (2006), which make 
sufficiently major alterations to the Rawlsian theoretical architecture as to require 
separate treatment. In this paper, then, unless otherwise specified, ‘public reason’ 
always means Rawlsian public reason, in its standard form. 
Second, by ‘moral status’, I mean the property of mattering non-
instrumentally from the moral point of view, and of warranting some form of respect. 
We can distinguish three ways in which a being may warrant respect, and so have 
moral status: as a bearer of rights, to whom principles of justice apply; as a bearer of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, e.g., Williams (2000, p. 208), Quong (2012a, p. 213, p. 282), Freeman (2004, pp. 2054-6), and 
Boettcher (2012, p. 169). According to Schwartzman (2004, p. 207), ‘we should assume that public 
justification is … determinate until we can be shown otherwise.’ 
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interests, to whom principles of beneficence apply; as an object of intrinsic value. I 
assume throughout that the claim that X warrants respect, and the claim that X has 
moral status, are equivalent. And I also therefore interpret Rawls, in his claim that 
respect for human life is a political value, to be saying that regard for the moral status 
of human life is such a value. 
Third, in the literature, public reason is generally described as ‘incomplete’ 
insofar as it disbars consideration of reasons without which citizens cannot 
collectively reach a conclusion on some question. Below I shall sometimes say that 
public reason is incomplete with respect to prenatal moral status, meaning that it 
cannot say what the status of the fetus is. But this is to be distinguished from the 
claim that public reason is incomplete with respect to the permissibility of abortion. 
On my argument, to repeat, public reason has clear and radical implications for that 
question, and is therefore not incomplete with respect to it - at least in the literature’s 
technical sense. 
 
2. Why public reason cannot address prenatal moral status 
To recapitulate, Rawlsians and their critics have formed contradictory assumptions 
regarding whether public reason provides citizens with the argumentative resources 
needed to debate and resolve the issue of prenatal moral status. Indeed, interestingly 
enough, Rawlsians contradict one another over which perspectives on prenatal moral 
status public reason can accommodate. For instance, Quong (2012a, p. 213) and 
Stephen Macedo (1997, pp. 16, 24) claim that public reason allows citizens to voice a 
variety of pro-life and pro-choice moral views, and that pro-life arguments to the 
effect that fetuses are persons with full rights to life can constitute reasonable 
interpretations and balances of available political values. But Samuel Freeman says 
7 
(2007, p. 408) that the case for fetal personhood has not hitherto been rendered in 
terms acceptable to public reason, and that it is unclear how it ever could be. Andrew 
Williams (2000, p. 208) suggests that public reason can resolve the question of 
whether fetuses have interests, and at what stage in gestation they acquire them. But 
Freeman (2007, p. 407) states that it is beyond public reason’s powers to rule on 
whether a fetus has the ‘moral status of a being with interests’. Williams (2000, p. 
208) also contends that public reason can determine whether and how far prenatal 
human life (independent of its possession of rights or interests) possesses intrinsic 
value (or ‘sanctity’, to use the synonym coined by Dworkin [1994]). And perhaps 
Freeman would agree, for he indicates (at 2007, pp. 407-8) that even if public reason 
cannot determine whether the fetus is a person with rights, or a being with interests, 
there is nonetheless a further form of respect (which he does not altogether clearly 
articulate) that reasonable citizens can acknowledge as attaching to human life in a 
‘straightforward’ biological sense, and factor into their decision-making. Quong, 
however, tells us (2012a, p. 17, and 2012b, pp. 57-8) that a distinguishing mark of 
political liberalism is that it disbars attributions of intrinsic value or sanctity from 
figuring in public justification.3 
 As these disagreements suggest, the limits which public reason imposes on 
participants in the abortion debate are far from immediately or intuitively clear, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Surprisingly, Quong claims elsewhere (2012a, p. 282) that ‘the sanctity of human life’ is a political 
value. Quong has clarified to me, however, that he intended in that passage only to affirm the looser 




rather something that requires analysis. To that end, in section 2.1, I first embark on a 
reconstruction of the Rawlsian position on the content of public reason (that is, of the 
total stock of deliberative resources on which public reasoners may draw), against 
which arguments concerning fetal moral status can be cross-checked for 
compatibility. Then, in section 2.2, I outline my overall case to the effect that such 
arguments necessarily fall outside the content of public reason, thus understood. 
Section 3 refines my thesis in light of two likely objections, and sections 4 and 5 
buttress it with additional arguments concerning public reason’s inability to 
accommodate disputes over fetal interests and intrinsic value. Section 6 draws out the 
implications for the decisions that public reasoners will be liable to reach about the 
legality of abortion. 
 
2.1. The content of public reason 
Rawls tells us that ‘the content of public reason is given by a family of political 
conceptions of justice’, and that ‘[t]o engage in public reason is to appeal to one of 
these political conceptions … when debating fundamental political questions’ (Rawls 
2005, p. 450, p. 453). Crucially, insofar as a family of such conceptions provides the 
relevant content, public reasoners are permitted to appeal to their favoured 
conception even when not everyone endorses it. Public reason does not, then, require 
citizens to bracket all points of moral controversy. Hence, if arguments concerning 
fetal moral status do indeed violate public reason, this will not be merely on grounds 
that they are controversial, but rather that they cannot be articulated entirely within a 
political conception of justice. 
 To determine whether they can be so articulated, we need a closer 
understanding of these conceptions. According to Rawls, the status of a conception 
9 
of justice as political depends upon its subject matter and mode of justification. 
Regarding subject matter, political conceptions address the design and functioning of 
the basic structure, rather than issuing moral demands to agents in all areas of life 
(Rawls 2005, p. 11). Regarding justification, political conceptions depend for their 
justification on political values. These are moral values which, Rawls says, belong to a 
‘special domain of the political’ - a ‘subdomain of the realm of all values’ (Rawls 2005, 
p. 139) - and ‘provide public reasons for all citizens’ (Rawls 2005, p. 386), meaning 
that citizens can be expected to see them as reason-giving, and take them into 
account in their political deliberations, whatever their comprehensive doctrinal 
affiliations (though they need not interpret them in the exact same way, or agree how 
much weight they are to be accorded). The justificatory relationship between the 
political values and a political conception of justice, according to Rawls, is twofold. 
First, the political values are the sole normative basis out of which a political 
conception must be constructed. And second, it is the job of a political conception to 
interpret, weigh, and order the political values so that they become specific enough to 
produce determinate answers to fundamental political questions, without 
supplementation from any comprehensive doctrine. As Rawls (2005, p. 386) 
summarises this relationship: 
 
In public reason the justification of the political conception takes into account only 
political values, and I assume that a political conception properly laid out is 
complete... That is, the political values specified by it can be suitably ordered, or 
balanced, so that those values alone give a reasonable answer by public reason to all 
or nearly all questions concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice. 
 
10 
Thus, in defending both their choice of a conception of justice, and their answers to 
fundamental political questions, public reasoners must appeal only to moral values 
that are political. Which values fall within this set, however? 
 On the standard Rawlsian formulations, political values are identifiable in (a) 
being ‘freestanding’ of comprehensive doctrines, and (b) representing fundamental 
liberal-democratic ideas that any reasonable citizen will share.4 Formulations (a) and 
(b) are generally presented as equivalent to each other, or two sides of the same coin. 
But that is not to say that either, employed on its own, is equally helpful in 
determining whether some value is political. 
 To see why, consider (a). To try to identify political values by their 
freestandingness is to try to identify them not positively, by their possession of 
distinctive, political-making features, but negatively, by elimination from an 
independently-identified category of the comprehensive. For a negative approach to 
isolating political values to work, we would need in hand a prior understanding of the 
comprehensive with clear, well-demarcated boundaries. Political liberals, however, 
have not furnished us with this. To be sure, they provide examples of ideas, or 
branches of philosophical enquiry, which they say belong to the comprehensive 
realm. Religious and metaphysical claims, and conceptions of the good, are the most 
commonly cited (with others including, e.g., rule-consequentialist or Scanlonian 
accounts of what it means for an act to be wrong). But rather than providing a 
general, positive account of the sphere of the comprehensive, which can be used to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I here ignore a number of other less prominent or promising descriptions of the political domain 
found in Rawls’s work. For a forensic examination of Rawls’s varied and problematic use of the term 
‘political’, see Gaus (2003, ch. 7). 
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throw light on the category of the political, Rawlsians standardly work in the other 
direction, defining the comprehensive negatively, as the sphere of the nonpolitical.5 
Thus, it is the domain of political values that needs to be identified first, with our 
understanding of the boundaries of the comprehensive falling out from it, rather than 
the other way around. This is where (b) - the understanding of the political values as 
the shared liberal-democratic commitments of reasonable citizens - comes in. 
 Unlike attempting to identify the political values by exclusion from a hazily-
defined category of comprehensive value, identifying them as the common values of 
reasonable citizens promises greater certainty regarding what is and is not a political 
value. This is because the shared normative horizons of reasonable citizens, as Rawls 
characterises them, are limited, and easier to pinpoint. Indeed, Rawlsian reasonable 
citizens are an idealised constituency who are definitionally committed only to the 
following normative beliefs: (1) the freedom of the person (understood according to 
Rawls’s political conception of the person, discussed below); (2) the equality of such 
persons; (3) fairness in social cooperation; and (4) public reason itself (this last 
commitment following from reasonable citizens’ acceptance of the so-called ‘burdens 
of judgement’) (see Rawls 2005, pp. 48-58). Let us refer to these as the core liberal 
values. As Rawls (2005, pp. 13-14) presents them, they are the central commitments of 
a liberal democratic political culture, and acceptable therefore to anyone who has 
properly internalised that culture. Rawls goes into a fair amount of detail regarding 
how, in liberal-democratic culture, he thinks the foregoing values are understood. For 
instance, the value of freedom, according to Rawls, includes the right to choose and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See especially Rawls (2005, p. 13), and also, e.g., Lister (2013, p. 181 n38). 
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revise a conception of the good, the status of being a ‘self-authenticating source of 
valid claims’, and the capacity to take responsibility for one’s ends (see Rawls 2005, p. 
30-34). At first sight, then, to reason publicly on the basis of values shared by all 
reasonable citizens means restricting oneself to arguing for, and on the basis of, a 
conception of justice that takes in, refines, and expresses precisely (and only) these 
core liberal values.6 As Quong (2012a, p. 261) encapsulates the resultant Rawlsian 
position: 
 
To show that some political proposal, X, is publicly justified, we appeal to what 
reasonable people have in common - we appeal to their shared view of society as a 
fair system of social cooperation between free and equal persons, and any further 
beliefs entailed by that ideal. You are not engaged in the practice of public reason 
unless you offer a reason or argument that will be acceptable to everyone in their 
capacity as free and equal citizens. 
 
Someone might query how, if the political values are values that are acceptable to all 
reasonable citizens, and the latter are defined by their acceptance of only the small set 
of values identified above, Rawls could claim, as he does (at 2005, p. 240), that ‘there 
are many political values and ways they can be characterized.’ I take it, however, that 
(as Quong’s words suggest) the answer is that citizens who are committed to the core 
liberal values will recognise them as entailing or containing certain further values, 
which also therefore have political status. For instance, I take it that the political 
liberal view is that for a citizen to be committed to the values of freedom, equality, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Rawls tells us that justice as fairness is such a conception, for instance. See Rawls (2005, p. 90). 
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and social cooperation, in their Rawlsian specifications, is also for her to be 
committed, e.g., to freedom of religion, equality of opportunity, and the social bases 
of mutual respect, to name some of the more specific political values mentioned by 
Rawls.7 Hence, there can be many political values, as Rawls claims, even if they have 
their sources in just a few.8 
 The promise of public reason, as I understand it, is that citizens who are 
divided on a host of philosophical matters can still resolve fundamental political 
problems in mutually acceptable terms by explicating the bounded set of liberal 
values that all of them, if reasonable, will accept. 9  The substance of the 
incompleteness objection, meanwhile, is that this promise is illusory. 
   
2.2. Respect for human life as a political value 
Return, then, to that objection. It would be easy to think that it is too difficult to 
show that public reason is incomplete on some issue, X, because this seems to require 
considering X from the perspective of all the political conceptions of justice that 
exist, or might in future.10 But this overstates the problem, at least in some cases. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For an impressively thorough list of the political values identified by Rawls across his relevant 
works, see Freeman (2004, pp. 2030-31 n25). It seems plausible to think that nearly all of these would 
indeed be concomitant commitments of anyone who subscribes to the core liberal values - the 
standout exception being, as I argue below, respect for human life. 
8 As for the many characterisations of those values, this results from the fact that citizens interpret them 
through their different political conceptions of justice. 
9 For consonant readings, see, e.g., Freeman (2004, p. 2027) and Quong (2012a, p. 5, p. 261). 
10 Cf. Williams (2000, p. 207). 
14 
Because publicly-admissible conceptions of justice must interpret and express only 
political values, one way to show that some dispute cannot be conducted within 
public reason is to show that is a dispute over the interpretation of a nonpolitical 
value. 
 Now, recall Rawls’s suggestion that respect for human life is a political value. I 
say that Rawls was mistaken in identifying this value as political, and that therefore 
the question of prenatal moral status is entirely beyond the remit of public reason. To 
begin, I need to explain more closely how I (take Rawls to) understand respect for 
human life. 
 Unlike a range of other political values, Rawls says nothing explicitly about 
what he takes respect for human life to involve. But we can make at least one 
important assumption about how he understands it. To wit, we can assume, as others 
have done (e.g., Freeman 2007, p. 84), that he has in mind a value that requires (as the 
name implies) respect for human life, as opposed, more narrowly, to respect only for 
the lives of persons. I do not assume, note, that Rawls thinks that to be committed to 
the value of respect for human life involves believing that strictly all human life 
warrants respect. Nor do I assume that he thinks it involves believing that the respect 
due to human life (when it is due) is due because there is something special about 
membership of the human species. All I assume is that, on Rawls’s view, a citizen 
who subscribes to the value of respect for human life accepts that the boundaries of 
the moral community take in at least some humans who are not persons, and believes 
that political decisions should give appropriate weight to that fact. 
 That Rawls understands respect for human life in this way is shown, first, by 
his listing it as a separate value, in addition to the political values enjoining various 
forms of respect for persons, and, second, by his invoking it in the context of 
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abortion. Abortion involves the killing of beings who, while human, are undoubtedly 
not persons - at least under the ‘political conception of the person’ that reasonable 
citizens are defined as recognising, and required to presuppose in public reasoning, in 
preference to whatever moral or metaphysical notion of personhood is suggested by 
their comprehensive doctrines. To say that the fetus is not, politically speaking, a 
person, is not to beg any substantive questions about prenatal moral status. Under the 
political conception of the person, in Rawls’s words (2005, p. 481), ‘we think of 
persons as citizens’ – that is, as individuals with the requisite minimum psychological 
capacities to take part in and benefit from fair social cooperation. More specifically, 
‘we think of persons as reasonable and rational, as free and equal citizens, with the 
two moral powers and having, at any given moment, a determinate conception of the 
good, which may change over time’ (Rawls 2005, p. 481, footnote deleted). It is, 
according to political liberalism, a hallmark of liberal political culture that citizens 
characteristically see themselves and each other in this way. A fetus, however, does 
not fulfil the criteria of political personhood at any stage of gestation.11 In order, then, 
to make sense of Rawls’s claim that respect for human life is relevant to abortion, and 
weighs on the side of restricting abortion rights, we must interpret it as a value 
enjoining respect for forms of human life beyond political persons. 
 The analysis of the content of public reason above enables us to see, 
moreover, that unless respect for human life thus construed is indeed a political 
value, citizens will be forbidden from publicly expressing or evaluating arguments to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It might be replied here that young children do not fulfill the criteria either, yet Rawls sometimes 
says that they are persons. I address this point in detail in section 3.1. 
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the effect that prenatal human life warrants respect or possesses moral status. If 
respect for human life is indeed a political value, public reasoners are free to appeal to 
it in political argument, as refined through their various political conceptions of 
justice. If not, however, then it is not for public reason to interpret the value’s 
requirements (or, for that matter, argue against its existence), just as, analogously, it is 
not for public reason to interpret (or criticise) a religious value of monogamy or 
sexual virtue to which some but not all reasonable citizens are committed.12 
 Having seen what is at stake in asking whether respect for human life is a 
political value, then, let me defend my answer. On the understanding of what it 
means for a value to be political set out earlier, if respect for human life is a political 
value then this must be in virtue of its being a normative commitment that reasonable 
citizens share, or an entailment of such a commitment. It is not, however. 
 To elaborate: as we have seen, reasonable citizens are an idealised 
constituency defined by acceptance of the core liberal values of freedom, equality, 
fairness, and public reason. According to Rawls, moreover, those values are 
conceptually tied to the moral powers, and therefore, by implication, limited in their 
zone of application to persons. Persons are held to be free and equal in a liberal 
society, Rawls claims, on grounds they are rational and reasonable to the minimum 
degree required for social cooperation (Rawls 2005, pp. 29-35, p. 79). And being free 
and equal in those respects, they are also consequently taken to be owed fair 
cooperative terms, and justifications for exercises of political power which they can 
reasonably accept (Rawls 2005, p. 213). Now, to be committed to the value of respect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 On monogamy’s status as a nonpolitical value, see Rawls (2005, p. 457). 
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for human life is, to reiterate, to be committed to the view that the boundaries of 
moral status are not drawn exclusively around persons, but also take in at least some 
other forms of human life. Thus understood, however, respect for human life cannot 
be seen as following from the core liberal values alone, nor as representing a more 
fine-grained specification of one or more of them. Rather, respect for human life is a 
broader ethical commitment on which there is no consensus among reasonable 
citizens, under the terms of their Rawlsian idealisation. It is perfectly consistent with a 
commitment to the core liberal values to deny that any modicum of respect is due to 
any beings who are not political persons. The shared core values do not, then, entail 
respect for human life, and nor therefore is it unreasonable for a citizen to reject that 
value. Of course, some reasonable citizens might situate their own support for liberal 
political values within a wider ethic of respect for human life, and join an overlapping 
consensus on the political values on that basis. Such an ethic is not, however, itself a 
shared political value. 
 Since the shared values of reasonable citizens do not include or entail respect 
for human life, political decisions justified with reference to (some interpretation of) 
that value always transgress the terms of public reason. To put the point in language 
due to Gerald Gaus (2011, p. 42, and passim), respect for human life is not among 
the subset of citizens’ evaluative standards against which they can all agree their basic 
structure should be judged. If that is right, public reasoners would still be permitted 
to argue that prenatal human life is of instrumental value to persons (a point to which 
I return in section 6). However, at the bar of public reason, the protection of prenatal 
life for its own sake (i.e. on grounds of its native moral status) is a sectarian concern. 
At this point, I envisage defenders of political liberalism objecting that the 
foregoing argument overlooks, and is incompatible with, various statements by Rawls 
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to the effect that political conceptions of justice not only may but must confer 
protection on two groups of humans who, like fetuses, currently lack the moral 
powers, and therefore seem not to qualify as political persons, to wit: young children, 
and unconceived members of future generations. If political conceptions must 
recognise members of the latter groups as having moral status, one might think, it is 
surely at least open to them to grant such recognition to fetuses. And if that is true, 
one might also think, discussion of prenatal moral status can indeed occur within 
public reason, between conceptions of justice offering rival perspectives on the 
matter. In the next section I refine and reaffirm my thesis that questions regarding 
prenatal moral status fall outside the competence of public reason, in the face of 
these alleged counter-examples. 
  
3. Justice, Personhood, and Rights 
3.1. Fetuses and children 
Consider first the objection that my thesis ignores the fact that, according to Rawls, 
public reason takes in arguments regarding the status and rights of young children, 
even though the latter, like fetuses, are too morally and rationally under-developed to 
engage in social cooperation. It is true that, particularly in ‘The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited’, Rawls is at pains to insist that family life, including child protection, is a 
concern of public reason (see Rawls 2005, pp. 466-74). Indeed, he says (2005, p. 474) 
that any reasonable political conception of justice will endorse ‘the equality of children 
as future citizens’. However, it would be too quick, pending further argument, to 
assume that Rawls’s claims about children undermine my argument regarding fetuses. 
For first, Rawls’s position on children might turn out to be ad hoc. And second, even 
if it has a coherent rationale, this might not extend to fetuses. 
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As to the first possibility, there is certainly room for puzzlement over the 
status of children in political liberalism. To be sure, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
assumes that children are subjects of justice (see Rawls 1999, p. 446), and stipulates 
(1999, pp. 218-20) that the inhabitants of the original position are to be deprived of 
knowledge of whether they represent individuals who are currently children or adults. 
It is not clear, however, that these holdings of Theory would successfully make the 
transition to political liberalism. Whether they can do so depends on whether the 
claim that children are subjects of justice, whom it is appropriate to represent in the 
original position, can be rendered in terms acceptable to all Rawlsian reasonable 
citizens. If it cannot, the inclusion of children as subjects of justice would, like the 
account of congruence presented in Part III of Theory, become another element of 
justice as fairness that falls foul of the problem of reasonable pluralism (given Rawls’s 
depiction of the parameters of that pluralism). Moreover, we have strong prima facie 
reason to suspect that the inclusion of children is indeed in tension with political 
liberalism. As we have seen, the political values on which political conceptions of 
justice are based apply to persons, conceived as cooperative citizens. But children, 
Rawls says, are not cooperative citizens, only future citizens. How, then, can a political 
conception see them now as subjects of justice, much less equal such subjects? 
The latter question – which concerns the accommodation of children’s rights 
issues in Rawls’s theory of political legitimacy, as opposed to the conception of 
justice presented in Theory – tends to be overlooked in the otherwise voluminous 
literature on the moral and political status of children. In addressing it, then, we will 
have to rely on Rawls’s own scattered comments on the matter, in Political Liberalism 
and subsequent works. Insofar as an answer suggests itself there, it appears to rest on 
the suggestion that it is among the central commitments of a liberal-democratic 
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political culture to regard children as equal members and rights-holders  - a 
commitment which reasonable citizens can thus be expected to share. Rawls says 
(2005, p. 41), for instance, that in a democratic society ‘we are not seen as joining 
society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into 
society where we will lead a complete life.’ And he also says (2005, p. xliii) that ‘[t]he 
fundamental political relation of citizenship… is a relation of citizens within the basic 
structure of society, a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by death.’13 These 
claims imply and correspond with a roomier specification of the political conception 
of the person, to which Rawls sometimes makes explicit appeal, whereby a person is 
not necessarily someone who now has the requisite moral powers for citizenship, but 
rather someone who ‘can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member 
of society over a complete life’ (Rawls 2005, p. 18, emphases added). If we take 
reasonable citizens to be defined in part by acceptance of this more expansive 
conception of the person, then a range of debates about the rights of young children 
can indeed proceed within public reason, on terms that all such citizens accept. 
Citizens would be free to advance rival views regarding precisely which rights 
children have, and how they ought best to be protected. They would not, however, of 
course, be free to dispute the idea that children are persons warranting protection 
under justice in the first instance. 
It is not necessary here to interrogate the claim that acceptance of young 
children as persons is a hallmark of a liberal-democratic political culture. For even if it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Note that, in saying that entry and exit are only by birth and death, Rawls means to abstract from the 
phenomenon of immigration.  
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is not merely an ad hoc fix for political liberalism to bring questions of children’s rights 
under the rubric of public reason by expanding the political conception of the person 
in this way, that move does not help bring questions of fetal rights (or moral status 
generally) under it. Indeed, the expanded conception of the person, as someone who 
has gained entry to her society by birth, draws a line between the infant and the fetus, 
thus providing grist to my mill. Importantly, moreover, the strategy by which political 
liberalism brings debates over the rights of children under the umbrella of public 
reason could not be emulated to bring debates over prenatal moral status under it. 
That is, a political liberal could not (or at least would be ill-advised to) argue that, just 
as the political conception of the person needs to be interpreted generously to ensure 
that the rights of young children are a proper concern of public reason, so it ought to 
be expanded again so that fetuses as well as children fulfill its conditions. That move 
would be doubly unacceptable. For first, insofar as the political values are supposed 
to be artifacts of a liberal-democratic political culture, it would commit political 
liberals to the implausible suggestion that it is part and parcel of such culture to view 
membership of society as acquired before birth. And second, it would generate 
deeply unsatisfactory restrictions on public reasoning, since deliberators could not 
then question the personhood of the fetus except on pain of becoming unreasonable, 
by rejecting an idea that reasonable citizens are required to accept. Revising the 
political conception of the person to incorporate fetuses, in short, would transform 
the constituency of public justification into a pro-life sect. 
I shall return below to the question of whether the defining beliefs of 
reasonable citizens could in another way be revised to allow deliberation to take place 
in a more suitably unrestricted form over prenatal moral status. To conclude this 
discussion, meanwhile: by adopting Rawls’s more generous interpretation of political 
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personhood, and stipulating that reasonable citizens accept it, political liberalism can 
ensure that public reasoners are able to consider a range of questions arising in 
relation to the rights of young children. But that theoretical move does nothing to 
facilitate debate among public reasoners over prenatal moral status, and hence poses 
no threat to my thesis. 
 
3.2. Fetuses and future generations 
As we have just seen, Rawls sometimes makes use of an expanded political 
conception of the person, whereby a person is not necessarily someone who can now 
exercise the moral powers, but rather someone who has joined political society by 
birth, and begun a life within it over which she will develop and exercise those 
powers. As I have argued, fetuses are still not persons under this wider conception of 
the person, and therefore still not beings whose treatment or status public reason has 
a remit to consider. However, members of future generations, it might now be 
objected, are analogous to fetuses, in that they too have yet to acquire the moral 
powers, or gain entry by birth to political society. Yet Rawls nonetheless contends 
that the question of what is owed to them is on the agenda of public reason. Indeed, he 
says (2005, at, e.g., p. lxii, or p. 15) that reasonable citizens view political society as an 
ongoing fair cooperative venture across generations. Thus, the objection avers, the 
characterisation of public reason as a forum for debate over the status and rights only 
of political persons (in either the narrow or wide senses described above) runs afoul 
of Rawls’s position on future generations. 
 The first point here is that, as Rawls acknowledges (2005, p. 245), his claim 
that a political conception of justice can settle the question of what is owed to future 
generations is conjectural. For rather than exploring fully how public reason would 
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approach that question, he relegates it to the status of one of the so-called ‘problems 
of extension’ (Rawls, 2005, p. 20). These are a category of political problems that it 
seems reasonable (in a quotidian sense) to expect public reasoning to be able to 
handle, but that also appear to test the resources of a political conception of justice, 
and will therefore need to be given further theoretical attention somewhere down the 
line, once it has been shown that public reason can adequately settle what Rawls 
considers the primary problem of political justice (the terms of social cooperation 
between contemporaneous citizens). So one option here would be for me to try to 
show that Rawls’s conjecture is false. In fact, however, I believe that it is not 
incoherent for political liberalism to claim that the issue of obligations to future 
generations belongs to political justice, and hence public reason, whilst maintaining 
that principles of political justice apply only to the born. 
 To explain: the objection under discussion appears to assume that to be 
committed to the claim that we are under obligations to future generations involves 
understanding the latter to have moral status and rights here and now, in advance of 
their existence or entry into society. However, it is coherent and arguably more 
plausible to instead claim, as philosophers often do, that while persons acquire the 
moral status of subjects of justice only if and once they exist, certain of the rights that 
as-yet-non-existent future persons will later acquire, insofar as they can be fulfilled or 
violated now, impose obligations on us in advance of their birth. By appealing to the 
latter claim, political liberals can say both that political society is to be conceived of 
from the point of view of reasonable citizens as a fair intergenerational scheme of 
social cooperation, wherein current members are under duties of justice to provide 
for their successors, and that, according to the democratic political culture that 
provides the content of public reason, membership of the scheme of social 
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cooperation, and the status of political personhood, is dependent upon birth. 
Precisely on those grounds, however, Rawls’s stipulation that reasonable citizens 
think of obligations to future generations as a question of political justice, to be 
addressed in public reason, is not in tension with my argument that the moral status 
of fetuses is not such a question.	  
 I conclude anew, then, that the terms of public reason preclude appeal to, or 
debate between, accounts of prenatal moral status. Before moving on in the next two 
sections to some supporting arguments for this conclusion, some final observations 
about this part of the discussion are merited. 
First, the objections I have anticipated here press against me the cases of two 
groups of beings who have not yet developed the moral powers of political 
personhood, but whose status and entitlements are, according to Rawls, nonetheless 
to be settled in public reason. Notice, however, that there is another group of beings 
who lack the moral powers whose treatment by Rawls can plausibly be thought to 
lend weight to my thesis – namely nonhuman animals. In contrast to children and 
future generations, Rawls is notably noncommittal (at Rawls 2005, p. 21) about 
whether political justice is the right lens through which to view the protection of 
animals and the environment (and by implication, therefore, over whether public 
reason can address those matters). And later, in a troubling passage (Rawls 2005, pp. 
245-6), he seems to indicate that the political values on which public reason can call 
in resolving these questions are entirely anthropocentric, and would generate, if relied 
upon, the conclusion that animals and nature are entirely ‘subject to our use and 
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wont’ – to be preserved, that is, only insofar as this serves our interests.14 This, note, 
is exactly what is implied by the account of public reason adduced in section 2.15 
Rawls acknowledges (2005, p. 246) that many people will be deeply unsatisfied with 
any resolution of animal and environmental protection questions that relies only on 
person-affecting values, and concludes his discussion with reassurance that, since 
these questions are not constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice, they are 
not issues on which he takes the use of public reason to be obligatory, but rather on 
which ‘citizens can vote their nonpolitical values and try to convince other citizens 
accordingly.’ That permission, however, is not available in the case of the abortion, 
which, as Rawls notes, either is a constitutional essential, or at least ‘borders on one’ 
(Rawls 2001, p. 117). 
Consideration of Rawls’s position on animals provides corroboration, I 
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14 I say that Rawls ‘seems to’ suggest this conclusion. I acknowledge a difficulty of interpretation, in 
that it is not wholly clear (at Rawls 2005, p. 245) whether he means to say that political conceptions of 
justice generally are apt to yield anthropocentric conclusions, or that contractarian conceptions like 
justice as fairness specifically do so. Tellingly, however, when Rawls considers the perspective of 
citizens who reject the view that animals and nature are to be thought of as instruments of use, and 
how they might make their case in the democratic forum, he does not claim that they can avail 
themselves of political values that justice as fairness, say, neglects. Rather, he envisages them going 
beyond the limits of public reason altogether, as, given his view that public reasoning is required only 
when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at issue, they are entitled to do. 
15 And is also consonant with the view in Theory, where Rawls suggests (1999, pp. 448-9) that a full 
account of our moral relationship with the natural world is not a task for a theory of justice but for 
metaphysics. 
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to be concerned that the terms of public reasoning he had drawn up would obstruct 
deliberation over, or affirmation of, the moral status of animals, and should have seen 
here the parallel with fetuses. The analogy with animals is, moreover, salient to this 
paper in another way. It is sometimes supposed (e.g. in Schwartzman 2004, p. 203) 
that Rawls was led to restrict the scope of public reason to matters concerning 
constitutional essentials and basic justice out of concern that, in other areas, public 
reason would prove indeterminate. Rawls’s discussion of animals, however, suggests 
that he may (instead or also) have been concerned that public reason, if relied upon 
across the board, would be in danger of returning determinate but ethically defective 
answers to some political questions – here, for instance, that because claims to the 
effect that animals have any kind of moral status depend on unshared comprehensive 
philosophical resources, animals must for political purposes be considered entirely 
liable to our ‘use and wont’. I return to this sort of possibility later.	  
 Finally, notice that, because what counts as a public reason depends on what 
reasonable citizens share, if political liberals are to alleviate the gap I have identified 
in the content of public reason concerning fetuses, they will need to somehow revise 
the normative beliefs that a person must hold in order to qualify as reasonable. We 
saw above that an unacceptable way to do this would be to widen the shared 
conception of the person so that fetuses fall under it. Another possibility, however, 
would be to insert respect for human life (or, perhaps, some comparable value, such 
as respect for sentient life, or for life simpliciter) among the shared values. If this were 
done, the terms of public reason would allow citizens to debate the new value’s 
content and requirements, and publicly justify their political decisions with reference 
to it, as with the other political values. I contend, however, that such an amendment 
to the criteria of reasonableness could not be made without undue sacrifice to the 
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coherence of the Rawlsian ideal of public reason. According to this ideal, where 
fundamental political matters are concerned, any citizen who accepts the basic tenets 
of liberal democracy is entitled to justifications for the ways in which political power 
is exercised over her, in terms that she is able to accept. As Rawls puts it, public 
reason ‘is a way of reasoning … that does not trespass on citizens’ comprehensive 
doctrines so long as those doctrines are consistent with a democratic polity’ (Rawls 
2005, pp. 490). In making the mooted amendment to the terms of reasonableness, 
however, political liberals would be shutting some citizens (namely anyone who does 
not accept the newly inserted political value) out of the constituency of public reason, 
despite their affirming the core liberal values concerning their fellow citizens, and 
thus holding doctrines consistent with a democratic polity. As a result, some fully 
paid-up liberals would end up governed according to ethical values that they cannot 
accept. By Rawlsian lights, then, the proposed amendment would render political 
liberalism an objectionably sectarian theory. Even supposing I am wrong, however, to 
doubt that some such revision to the constituency of public reason could be made 
without serious cost to the coherence of political liberalism, the central thrust of the 
paper to this point would still stand: to wit, that in its current form, Rawlsian public 
reason is unable to accommodate deliberation over prenatal moral status. 
 
4. Fetal interests 
As we have seen, a citizen’s public reasoning must proceed, as Rawls (2005, p. 453) 
puts it, ‘entirely within a political conception of justice.’ If, then, as I have argued, 
fetuses cannot be regarded as subjects of justice under a political conception of 
justice, there is nothing more to be said about prenatal moral status within the 
parameters of public reason. For anything one could say would necessarily be drawing 
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on, or taking issue with, resources taken from the comprehensive philosophical 
realm. Now, many people believe that fetuses have rights, or acquire them at some 
point during gestation. On my analysis, while these people may be appealing to a 
conception of justice, they cannot be appealing to a political conception of justice, and 
are thus disbarred in public reason from making their case. Other people believe that, 
while fetuses lack rights, they nonetheless have, for at least part of pregnancy, an 
interest in living, which merits respect as a matter of beneficence.16 Again, however, 
because this view appeals to a moral principle beyond political justice, public reason 
does not allow it to figure in justification, but rather insists on neutrality towards it. 
In this section and the next I provide two supplemental arguments regarding 
public reason’s inability to accommodate debate over prenatal moral status. 
According to the first, public reasoners will be unable to stake any claims concerning 
whether and how far fetuses have an interest in continuing to live. This would be a 
serious setback for public reasoning about abortion even if everything I had argued to 
this point were wrong. For consider: those who believe that the morality of feticide is 
best judged through the lens of beneficence clearly need an account of whether 
fetuses have interests in living, when they acquire them, and how strong they are. So 
do those who believe that the morality of feticide should be viewed as a matter of 
justice and rights, if they share the common view that the injustice of killing is 
explained at least partially by the harm the victim. As I now argue, however, citizens 
cannot answer these questions about fetal interests, except by violating public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For such a view of prenatal moral status, and an associated bifurcation of morality between a 
morality of respect, or justice, and a morality of interests, or beneficence, see McMahan (2002). 
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reason’s requirement of neutrality over the good. 
I first need to clarify what the aforementioned requirement involves. It is not a 
requirement to abstain from making any claims whatsoever about the good of 
individuals (or, to use terms which I assume to be synonymous, their well-being, or 
interests). For, as Rawls stresses (2005, at, e.g., p. 175-6), public reasoning cannot 
fruitfully proceed without invoking ideas of the good. For instance, unless 
deliberators have some handle on what individual well-being consists in, they will be 
unable to evaluate what a fair distribution of benefits and burdens looks like. But 
while public reasoning must, Rawls accepts, draw on certain ideas of the good, all 
such ideas must, to meet the requirement of neutrality, be sufficiently thin as to be 
endorsable by reasonable citizens generally, irrespective of the details of their specific 
conceptions of what makes life go well. Rawls takes the claim that persons have an 
interest in obtaining more rather than fewer primary social goods to be thin in this 
sense, for instance, since it can be viewed as following from the democratic idea of 
persons as free (which includes their being rational project pursuers) that reasonable 
citizens share. 
 Insofar as public reasoning must maintain neutrality, in general, between 
conceptions of the good, it must, I contend, maintain neutrality, in particular, 
between the following reasonable conceptions of what makes life go best, and their 
various permutations: (1) the experiential account, whereby the good of individuals 
consists in having certain experiences (pleasurable experiences, in the case of the 
best-known, hedonic version of the account, but conceivably others too); (2) the 
desire-fulfilment account, whereby our lives go well insofar as our desires (or some subset 
of them, such as rationally-reflective desires) are satisfied; (3) the objective list account, 
whereby an individual flourishes when her life meets certain objective criteria (e.g. the 
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cultivation of particular virtues), irrespective of whether they are desired, or affect her 
experience. Unfortunately, arguments to the effect that a fetus, at some stage of 
gestation, does or does not have an interest in not being killed, are unavoidably non-
neutral between such conceptions. 
Some familiar arguments about fetal interests in life are explicitly non-neutral. 
Thus, on one familiar view, fetuses cannot (at any gestational age) have such an 
interest because: (a) to have an interest in some good, G, presupposes a desire for G, 
and (b) the fetus is incapable of desiring the good of continued life, since, lacking 
self-consciousness, it is incapable of conceiving of itself as having a future. 
Irrespective of its merits, this argument avows a controversial thesis about the 
relationship between well-being and desire that conflicts with some reasonably-held 
conceptions of the good. 
Other perspectives on fetal interests may not wear their commitments to a 
conception of the good on their sleeves to the same extent, but all are nonetheless 
incompatible with the truth of at least some conceptions which citizens might 
reasonably hold. Thus, to say that fetuses have interests in living, at any point in 
pregnancy, is to say, by implication, that at least some aspects of well-being are 
independent of rationally-reflective desires (the reason being that, as we just saw, 
fetuses are at no point in pregnancy self-conscious, nor therefore capable of 
rationally-reflective desires). Even to argue that an early, non-sentient fetus lacks 
interests (as, e.g., Williams [2000, p. 208] envisages public reasoners doing) is to deny 
the truth of any version of the objective list account on which there are modes of 
flourishing available to a non-sentient human being. Such views of well-being may 
strike many as utterly implausible. However, sizeable numbers of people clearly 
believe them. They believe, for instance, that to allow an early embryo to develop into 
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an infant is good for the embryo, and that, at the other end of existence, life for a brain-
dead adult on life support can still, in various respects, go better or worse for her. 
These beliefs, whether or not implausible, are not unreasonable. That is, they do not 
offend against the core normative commitments of reasonableness in a way that 
would, under political liberalism, justify abandoning neutrality with respect to them. 
Rawls (2005, p. 59) insists that political liberalism ‘avoid[s] excluding doctrines as 
unreasonable without strong grounds based on clear aspects of the reasonable itself.’ 
In sum, then, claims about the interests of fetuses in going on living always are, or 
entail, publicly-inadmissible, thick claims about the good. 
 
5. Intrinsic value 
This penultimate section provides one last argument concerning the argumentative 
restraint which public reason calls for on prenatal moral status. As noted in section 2, 
Andrew Williams has suggested that it lies within the power of public reason to 
determine whether and how far fetal human life is intrinsically valuable, or sacred (see 
Williams 2000, p. 208). ‘Without denying the truth of any reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine’, he says, citizens ‘might argue that a first trimeseter foetus enjoys some 
moral status because of the intrinsic value of human life... Even so, they might still 
believe that the intrinsic value of human life was outweighed by other more weighty 
political values, and conclude that the status of the foetus is not a sufficient reason to 
restrict women’s procreative liberty.’ Three points, I believe, suffice to show that 
arguments on this question cannot be true expressions of public reason.  
First, consider a parallel between the value of life and the value of autonomy. 
On a Kantian view, autonomy (or the human capacity for it) is intrinsically valuable - 
not merely valuable insofar as it is good for the agent or anyone else. According to 
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political liberalism, Kantian understandings of the value of autonomy are an 
unsuitable basis for public justification. Public reasoners, Rawls argues, should not 
take any stand which reasonable citizens would not all accept about the ways in which 
autonomy is of value (Rawls 2005, p. xliii). But by that token, to allow the affirmation 
(or denial) of the claim that human life is intrinsically valuable, independently of 
whether it is good for the individual whose life it is, or for third parties, while 
prohibiting the expression of equivalent claims regarding autonomy, would be 
inconsistent. 
Second, as political liberalism conceives them, a citizen’s comprehensive 
doctrine provides her with a systematic account of value. In Rawls’s words, a fully 
comprehensive doctrine aspires to cover ‘all recognized values and virtues within one 
rather precisely articulated system’ (Rawls 2005, p. 13). I take it, then, that such a 
doctrine seeks to explain what in life and the universe matters in itself, and what has 
value only derivatively. By that token, however, for public reason to pass judgement 
on questions of intrinsic value is for it to abrogate to itself tasks which are the 
preserve of individuals’ comprehensive doctrines. 
Third, the role of the political conceptions of justice on which public reason is 
based is to articulate what individuals owe to each other, and are owed, as members 
of a political society. They specify, that is, rights to liberties and opportunities, and 
adjudicate competing claims to the fruits of social cooperation. However, questions 
about what objects in the world have intrinsic value, and what respect for them 
requires, are not questions about justice thus construed, since the duty to respect or 
not waste intrinsic value is impersonal, not correlative to anybody’s right. 
I conclude, then, pace Williams, that public reason would be overstepping itself 
in determining whether fetal life has intrinsic value, just as, according to the 
33 
arguments above, it would be overstepping itself in determining whether fetuses have 
rights, or interests in continued life. It remains, then, to investigate what all this 
portends for public reason’s handling of the question of abortion’s legality. 
 
6. The incompleteness objection reconsidered 
I have argued that public reason is entirely indeterminate on prenatal moral status. It 
can confirm no more than that the fetus is not a person, in the Rawlsian political 
sense; subsequent to that, it simply ‘runs out’. In this final leg of the paper, I first 
argue that public reason’s muteness on prenatal moral status does not produce 
indeterminacy on the question of abortion, but rather produces a radically permissive 
answer to it (section 6.1). I then argue that the availability in public reason of 
arguments for restricting abortion for the sake of parties other than the fetus cannot 
be relied upon to significantly moderate that radical result (6.2). Finally, I distinguish 
several grounds for thinking that public reason’s incompleteness regarding prenatal 
moral status is problematic, despite its not depriving citizens of the ability to reach a 
verdict on abortion policy (6.3). 
 
6.1. How public reason remains determinate on abortion 
The claim that public reason disbars citizens from deliberating about prenatal moral 
status, but does not thereby prevent them from resolving the abortion question, may 
seem peculiar. The latter question is standardly regarded as a matter of deciding 
whether and how far to prioritise the interests and rights of the woman over the life 
of the fetus when these are in conflict. And surely, one might think, citizens cannot 
form a view on that matter until they can say how much the fetus counts for from the 
moral point of view. The confusion is dissolved by noticing that, if judgements about 
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prenatal moral status are not admissible in public reason, deliberators must give them 
no weight, which is equivalent in practical upshot to their assuming that, throughout 
gestation, a fetus simply has no moral status. Without denying that fetal life warrants 
respect in some form, then, public reason requires that citizens ignore claims to that 
effect for political purposes, just as they must, say, ignore without denying claims to 
the effect that such-and-such a policy is commanded by God. 
If this is correct, however, public reason is far from indeterminate on the 
question of abortion. From the perspective of public reason, there is no maternal-
fetal conflict to resolve, at any point prior to birth. From that perspective, then, it is 
never legitimate to restrict women’s rights of procreative and bodily autonomy for 
the sake of the fetus, even at full term. This position on abortion is obviously 
permissive to a degree that very few people would be willing to accept. Even those 
who identify as staunchly pro-choice typically favour a legal cut-off, coinciding with 
what they take to be a morally significant point in fetal development, before which 
the woman’s decision to end her pregnancy should generally be dispositive, but 
beyond which a termination should be provided only with a strong justification. 
In arguing that public reason is not rendered indeterminate on abortion by its 
incompleteness regarding prenatal moral status, I dissent from standard articulations 
of the incompleteness objection. The difference between us appears to arise from the 
fact that proponents of that objection generally do not dispute the political status of 
the value of respect for human life. The problem they envisage is therefore that, 
although public reasoners will know that respect for human life is a salient political 
value, that needs somehow to be factored into their decision-making, they will be 
unable to determine how much to count it for, without support from their 
comprehensive doctrines, and will therefore fail to reach any conclusions. On my 
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account, however, public reasoners do not face this particular difficulty. Indeed, the 
example of abortion highlights a point that is often under-appreciated in the 
literature: that more restrictive rules of public reasoning can enhance rather than 
hamper determinacy, by screening out considerations that complicate decisions. 
Some political liberals have anticipated that public reason would prove 
inhospitable to pro-life abortion settlements, by disbarring citizens from invoking the 
accounts of embryonic/fetal personhood and rights that underpin them (see, e.g., 
Freeman 2004, p. 2060; Williams 2000, p. 208). They have not, however, anticipated 
that public reason would also prove inhospitable to the moderate qualifications on 
abortion rights favoured by mainstream pro-choicers. And they would, I assume, be 
very unlikely to welcome that consequence of their theory (for reasons which I 
explore in more detail later). A political liberal might here object, however, that we 
should not be too quick to assume that public reason is incompatible with moderate 
or more restrictive perspectives on abortion. To do so, she might claim, would be to 
take for granted too narrow an understanding of the range of reasons that are 
relevant to determining the legal status of abortion, and more specifically to wrongly 
suppose that the only grounds for restricting abortion must be given by an account of 
prenatal moral status. To obtain a fuller picture of what public reason implies for the 
resolution of the abortion issue, we will need to consider this point in detail. 
 
6.2. Third parties and abortion 
In his abortion footnote in Political Liberalism, Rawls (2005, p. 243 n32) envisaged 
public reasoners deciding how far to permit abortion by weighing respect for human 
life against two further political values – women’s equality, and what he called ‘the 
ordered reproduction of political society over time’. We can distinguish, more 
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generally, between reasons for (dis)favouring some candidate abortion settlement that 
focus on its impact for (a) the fetus, (b) the woman, and (c) third-parties, or society at 
large. Even if appeal to reasons of type (a) are disallowed by public reason, a political 
liberal might emphasise, at least some type-(c) reasons also count in favour of 
restricting abortion rights. Thus, she might conclude, public reason does not 
constrain citizens to accept the extreme view that the right to end a pregnancy should 
be entirely unqualified in law.  
Viewed one way, this envisaged response may seem somewhat beside the 
point. To reiterate, the question of abortion, as standardly construed, is the question 
of whether and how far women’s reproductive and bodily autonomy should be 
curtailed out of concern for the moral value or worth of prenatal human life. And as I 
have argued, public reason settles that question by fiat. The reply we are considering 
appears to concede this point, while adding only that public reason can do a better 
job at handling the related but distinct question of how far rights to procreative choice 
should be abridged for the sake of other persons in society. But that was not in 
dispute. 
The political liberal might counter-reply, however, that the fact that public 
justifications for limiting abortion rights are available after all renders my argument 
much less worrisome. For it suggests that the content of public reason would not 
unduly restrict citizens’ options in political advocacy, or constrain a community to 
accept conclusions about abortion that are too discordant with its members’ moral 
convictions. Indeed, the political liberal might suggest that, since the duty of civility 
does not require citizens to defend their political decisions on grounds of the moral 
reasons that actually motivate them, as long as they provide a balance of public 
reasons that they sincerely think adequate to justify those decisions, sufficiently 
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reflective citizens should be able to come up with third-party or society-focused 
arguments whose implications for the legal regulation of abortion coincide with, and 
can be used in public reason as a substitute for, their inadmissible views about the 
fetus.17  
 These claims have some surface plausibility. But as a defence of political 
liberalism’s handling of the abortion issue, they are ultimately, I believe, just clutching 
at straws. On reflection, there seems little cause for confidence that the set of third-
party-focused reasons for limiting abortion rights can be relied upon to do the work 
in political argument that the defence requires – and abundant reason to suppose 
otherwise. The best way to confirm this is to explore the various third party or 
societal claims and interests that are, or could be, invoked in democratic debate in 
support of limitations on the right to choose. And it makes sense to begin by 
returning to Rawls’s political value of the ordered reproduction of political society. 
It may seem natural to interpret Rawls, in citing this value, to be referring to a 
societal interest in ensuring that whatever reproduction its members decide to engage 
in occurs in a safe, reliable fashion. Interpreted this way, the value of ordered 
reproduction seems to support rather than undermine the case for more generous 
abortion rights (since when women cannot access legal abortion, they are at risk of 
turning to more dangerous alternatives). Perhaps surprisingly, however, what Rawls 
in fact appears to have had in mind is a societal interest in perpetuating itself, which is 
in tension with the interests of individuals in deciding whether to bear children. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In assuming that citizens need not argue in public reason on the basis of the reasons that really 
motivate them, I follow Schwartzman (2011).  
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when speaking elsewhere of the ordered reproduction of society he writes that 
 
[p]olitical society is always regarded as a scheme of social cooperation over time 
indefinitely; the idea of a future time when its affairs are to be concluded and society 
disbanded is foreign to the conception of political society. Thus, reproductive labor 
is socially necessary labor. (Rawls 2005, p. 467.) 
 
Assume that reasonable citizens, insofar as they endorse the idea of society as an 
ongoing scheme of cooperation, would also therefore endorse this interpretation of 
the value of ordered social reproduction, and the associated claim that reproductive 
labour is socially necessary. Nonetheless, the view that the social necessity of 
reproductive labour provides a sufficiently strong public reason to justify coercively 
directing people’s reproductive capacities seems highly eccentric – it is questionable 
that more than a small minority of reasonable citizens would affirm it, especially 
given the availability of other, less intrusive governmental means for adjusting 
population levels, such as immigration policy, or financial incentives to procreation. 
Indeed, the value of ordered social reproduction does not count more heavily in 
favour of restricting abortion than contraception. So unless we can readily imagine a 
diverse liberal democracy agreeing to limit access to contraception on grounds of this 
value, we should doubt that it would be likely to conclude that that same value is 
sufficient to justify restricting abortion rights – at least if its members cannot 
articulate an intrinsic moral difference between killing a fetus and preventing the 
existence of a person, as public reasoners cannot. 
The view that reproductive labour can be coerced on grounds of the value of 
ordered reproduction seems unlikely to find favour under conditions of evaluative 
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diversity, then. In addition, however, it is unclear that the view actually qualifies as 
reasonable. Rawls tells us that reasonable citizens, in endorsing the political values of 
freedom, equality, and fairness, will also endorse political conceptions of justice that 
are liberal, in the sense of awarding citizens the sorts of basic rights and liberties 
familiar in constitutional regimes (including, I take it, rights to bodily and 
reproductive autonomy), and conferring on those rights ‘special priority’, ‘especially 
with respect to the claims of the general good’ (Rawls 2005, p. 450). It is dubious, 
however, that restricting abortion on grounds of society’s alleged need for new 
members would be compatible with this special priority - at least outside the context 
of some national emergency. But in that case, as well as being bizarre, the argument is 
not publicly admissible. 
So much, then, for the Rawlsian value of ordered societal reproduction. It 
seems unlikely that most observers of the public debate over abortion will have come 
across arguments that appeal to it. Other arguments pertaining to the supposed 
effects of abortion on society do, however, crop up in the real world with somewhat 
greater frequency. To take a notable example, it is sometimes said that the practice of 
abortion contributes to a ‘culture of death’, or to breaking down the taboos against 
harming others on which all our safety depends. Even if this claim could be 
empirically supported, it would not necessarily provide the basis for a plausible 
argument for restricting abortion rights (this would depend on such factors as the 
extent of the social harm done, and whether it could be counteracted by other 
means).  However, as David Boonin notes (2003, pp. 298-9), the claim is not 
empirically supported, and is, indeed, vulnerable to evidence that abortion access 
reduces not only rates of illegal infanticide, but violent crime more generally. This 
may not concern proponents of the argument, who seem often to be conservatives 
40 
who think it self-evident that liberal societies are in a state of decline into barbarism. 
It should concern us, however. For it is worth noting that, although the central and 
most distinctive aspect of the Rawlsian duty of civility is its requirement that citizens 
abstain in political argument from reliance on reasonably contestable comprehensive 
doctrines, the duty also includes requirements of conformity to accepted standards of 
inference and evidence (Rawls 2005, at, e.g., p. 139, 465). These requirements seem 
well-motivated elements of a duty that aims, as Rawls has it, at genuine public 
justification, as opposed to mere rhetoric or persuasion (Rawls 2005, p. 220). But 
therefore, citizens who propose to coerce their fellows on the basis of the culture-of-
death argument in the absence of the needed empirical corroboration violate both the 
letter and spirit of public reason. 
Are there any other arguments available to the effect that abortion should be 
restricted for the benefit of, or to avoid harms to, society at large? Consider a further, 
less familiar proposal. It might be claimed that, since permitting feticide without 
restriction throughout pregnancy would be repugnant at the bar of many citizens’ 
comprehensive doctrines, for the state to adopt that policy would be for it to invite 
unrest. Thus, one might think, limitations on the right to abortion could be publicly 
justified on grounds of social stability and security (political values to which any 
reasonable citizen must be committed, insofar as they are prerequisites of justice). 
A major problem with this suggestion is that to threaten unrest, and insist that 
one’s comprehensive doctrine be given priority over the determinations of public 
reason, is to make oneself unreasonable by political liberal lights. And it is therefore 
unclear why, for the political liberal, the correct response to the unreasonableness of 
citizens who cannot accept public reason’s implications for abortion should be to 
accede to their demands, rather than, in particular, adopt a policy of containment 
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towards them and their doctrines. Indeed, appeasement would arguably only create 
perverse incentives to further unreasonableness, to the greater detriment of stability 
and security, as well as the ideal of public reason itself. 
To be sure, under certain specific societal conditions, a policy of appeasement 
may indeed be justified on balance. But insofar as those conditions are not reliably 
met, appeal to the values of stability and security provides only a contingent and 
unstable public justification for imposing restrictions on abortion. In addition, and 
more fundamentally, any society in which the threat of unrest is sufficiently serious 
and widespread to warrant appeasement of the unreasonable, at the cost of some 
citizens’ procreative and bodily autonomy, does not seem to have a claim to be 
regarded as well-ordered according to the ideal of public reason. For the stability of 
which it is capable, and which appeasement purchases, is not the sort of stability that, 
according to Rawls, characterises such a well-ordered society. It is not, that is, 
‘stability for the right reasons’, which is based on general willing acceptance by 
citizens of the deliberative primacy of the political values over their rival 
comprehensive doctrines (as opposed to a mere balance of forces). Remember that 
the suggestion we are currently considering, to the effect that restrictions on abortion 
could be publicly justified on grounds of the political values of stability and security, 
is envisaged as a defence of public reason against the charge that it generates (or fails 
to provide effective argumentative means for citizens to challenge) extreme 
libertarianism about abortion. It is not satisfactory as such a defence, however, to cite 
the possibility of a democratic argument whose success is conditional precisely on the 
fact that the ideal of public reason is not properly in force. In a society truly governed 
by the ideal of public reason, the stability/security-based argument could not be 
made. 
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So far I have considered arguments against permissivist abortion laws that do 
not distinguish between the expected effects of the law on different groups in society. 
But there are other arguments sometimes voiced in the public forum that do so. I 
have in mind three in particular. First, some contend that prenatal testing and 
selective termination for fetal disability ought to be prohibited for the sake of existing 
disabled members of society, upon whom it is said to have a negative impact (for 
instance, because it is seen to send an objectionable, inegalitarian message about the 
quality of their lives and value to others). Second, others aver that sex-selective 
abortion should be banned, out of parallel concern about the damage it is seen to do 
to the interests and social standing of women and girls. Third, still others believe that 
biological fathers are entitled to a say in (or at least to be pre-notified about) their 
partners’ abortion decisions, on grounds of the equal significance for them of 
parenthood. Do the availability in public reason of any of these arguments help the 
Rawlsian’s case? 
Each of the aforementioned arguments is, of course, extremely controversial - 
turning, as they do, on disputed claims about (inter alia) the scale of the effects of 
women’s abortion choices on others, and the scope of persons’ legitimate 
prerogatives to do what is best for themselves at others’ expense. Intriguingly, of the 
three restrictive policies, it seems that opposition to sex-selective abortion currently 
has the widest currency in the public debate, whereas in most liberal societies it is a 
relatively settled matter that fathers should not have legal rights in respect of their 
partners’ abortions, and that women should not be prevented from selectively 
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aborting disabled fetuses.18 It seems plausible, however, to suppose that, in a political 
community governed by the ideal of public reason, democratic support for all these 
policies would decline somewhat. This is because at least part of that support derives 
not from people’s beliefs about the interests or rights of third parties, but from their 
beliefs about prenatal moral status. Many who oppose selective abortion do so 
because they believe that disabled or female fetuses have rights not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of morally arbitrary personal characteristics. And at 
least some who support paternal abortion rights do so on grounds that fathers have 
(as they see it) responsibilities to act as guardians for their unborn children. This 
suggests that the prospects for any of these policies making it into law in a political 
liberal society will be somewhat more remote than they are at present. Other than 
that, it is obviously difficult to engage in firm predictions about their chances of 
democratic enactment. There is, however, an important point to be made about the 
third-party-focused arguments for those policies that does not rely on such 
predictions. 
This is that, because these arguments address issues that are orthogonal to the 
moral problem of abortion (as traditionally understood), they will predictably do little, 
if anything, to establish conclusions about the way abortion law should be framed 
that allay the central concerns of citizens who hold either moderate or more 
conservative views. They are not, in other words, likely to be effective or valuable 
proxies in public reason for those citizens’ inadmissible views about prenatal moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For an argument, however, to the effect that those of us who are committed to a woman’s right to 
selectively abort for fetal disability ought also to affirm a right to sex-selective abortion, see Williams 
(2012). 
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status. Consider, as illustration, the mainstream view that it is seriously wrong for the 
law to permit third-trimester abortion on demand, or without a weighty justification 
(such as the preservation of the woman’s life or health). Those who take this view are 
unlikely to find it a substantial improvement if the law is qualified so that third 
trimester abortions can take place whenever the biological father does not oppose it, 
or whenever the woman’s aim is not, specifically, to select against an unwanted fetal 
trait. For those legal provisions fail to restrict many instances of what the mainstream 
view takes to be wrongful feticide. Indeed, these citizens may well think that to 
qualify the right to choose as proposed by the foregoing arguments would be worse 
than not qualifying it at all. It is a mistake to assume that, from the point of view of 
those who believe that abortion is wrong (at some gestational stage), any restrictions 
on the legal permission to end a pregnancy (at that stage), however justified, must be 
a welcome improvement. Many proponents of moderate pro-choice views, for 
instance, would clearly rather accept unrestricted late-term abortion as the lesser evil 
than grant men rights to interfere with their partners’ reproductive decisions, or deny 
women the option of using prenatal selection to avoid having children who will 
(perhaps owing to a social climate of unjust discrimination) disadvantage them. Nor 
would it necessarily be incoherent for pro-life citizens, who believe that abortion is in 
general wrong to refuse to endorse those proposals. They might do so, for instance, 
on grounds that to restrict procreative rights for reasons less compelling than the 
defence of innocent life would set a dangerous precedent for the dilution of 
individual autonomy. In short, then, arguments that appeal to the adverse effects of 
selective abortion on the disabled or women as social groups, or to the interests of 
men in deciding whether to become parents, are of little advantage to citizens whose 
aim is to mount a case for moderate or conservative abortion regimes, even if their 
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moral beliefs would permit them to invoke them, as they may well not. 
I have now covered all the third-party-centred arguments for limiting abortion 
rights that I can think of. Our aim in exploring them was to evaluate a defence of 
public reason according to which, because citizens have the option of invoking 
arguments that appeal to the effects of abortion on others in society as a substitute 
for their non-public views about prenatal moral status, a political liberal society will 
not find itself unduly constrained to adopt abortion policies that are entirely 
permissive, or that diverge sharply from its members’ considered moral judgements. 
Our survey of third-party-focused arguments suggests that their utility as substitutes 
for conventional arguments concerning prenatal moral status is severely limited, not 
only because the policy implications of the two sets of arguments will often fail to 
substantially align, but also because the third-party-based arguments are in general 
extremely lacking in persuasive power, breadth of appeal, and applicability under 
diverse social circumstances. The claim that those arguments stand to win sufficient 
democratic support to significantly shape abortion policy in a society governed by 
public reason, or that they could serve as a reliable and effective brake against public 
reason’s otherwise wholly permissive implications for the legal regulation of feticide, 
seems optimistic, to put it mildly. 
To be sure, public reason is in principle compatible with the imposition of 
restrictions on abortion. The balance of eligible public reasons, however, can 
nonetheless be said to incline strongly towards radically permissive laws (and away 
from both mainstream moral views and legal practice in most liberal regimes), in the 
sense that the most powerful, generally applicable, and widely-shared moral reasons 
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for favouring more moderate laws have been stripped out, significantly increasing the 
impediments to their enactment.19  
The constraints of public reason, in sum, would alter the terms of the 
democratic debate over abortion unrecognisably, while orienting it heavily towards 
conclusions that most citizens are likely to find morally jarring. For a political liberal 
to claim otherwise, on grounds of the availability in public reason of third-party-
focused justifications for restricting abortion, is, I submit, for her to place far more 
weight on the latter justifications than they can plausibly be expected to bear. 
 
6.3. Why determinacy is not enough 
My task so far has been to bring out the implications of public reason for the way in 
which a Rawlsian society will resolve the political issue of abortion. In doing so, I 
have merely assumed that the implications identified would be judged objectionable, 
both by critics of public reason and political liberals themselves. It is, however, 
important to clarify what makes them so. If our complaint against public reason’s 
incompleteness on prenatal moral status can no longer be (as earlier critics had it) that 
it causes indeterminacy regarding abortion’s legal permissibility, what might it be 
instead? And how damaging would our complaint(s) be to political liberalism? I close 
the paper by speaking to these questions. My answers suggest the need for further 
work exploring the implications of public reason for political issues beyond abortion. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 My use of the language of an incline in public reason toward a particular set of rules or rights is 
reminiscent, of course, of Gaus. My explanation of the way in which Rawlsian public reason inclines 
towards radically permissive abortion laws differs, however, from his account (in, e.g., Gaus 2011, ch. 
VIII) of how his own model of justificatory liberalism inclines towards classical liberalism. 
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Probably the simplest available objection to political liberalism’s approach to 
abortion begins by endorsing the mainstream moral view that, at least in the late 
stages of pregnancy, a fetus warrants at least some protection in law for its own sake, 
which it would be morally wrong for the law to fail to reflect. The objection goes on 
to claim that, since Rawlsian public reason inclines strongly towards laws that are 
morally defective in this way, it is therefore itself morally unsound. Call this the ethical 
objection. It might be suspected that the ethical objection begs the question against 
public reason, by assuming precisely the approach to politics that political liberalism 
sets itself against: ‘the zeal’, as Rawls puts it, ‘to embody the whole truth’ (Rawls 
2005, p. 442). But this would be a mistake. As Rawls notes, ‘whether this [i.e. his 
own] or some other understanding of public reason is acceptable can be decided only 
by examining the answers it leads to over a wide range of the more likely cases’ 
(Rawls 2005, p. 254). Moreover, in evaluating whether the answers delivered by 
public reason are acceptable, our perspective cannot be that of public reason itself, 
since from that point of view, the answers reached will ex hypothesi be reasonable. 
Hence, what ultimately matters, in assessing the Rawlsian model of public reason, is 
whether its pronouncements are sufficiently in line – in reflective equilibrium - with our 
considered moral judgements (as evaluators of political liberalism). If not, there is no 
higher court of appeal, as it were, at which public reason might be acquitted. 
That said, the ethical objection is limited in two respects. First, while radical 
permissivism about abortion is clearly a minority view, it has adherents. For those 
who accept it, the fact that public reason inclines towards a policy of unrestricted 
abortion choice would not make political liberalism more unattractive. Second, even 
those who are committed to a more moderate view of abortion may not, if they are 
sympathetic to political liberalism, be sure whether the less philosophically costly path 
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is to reject that theory, on grounds of its implications for abortion, or bite the bullet, 
by retaining their commitment to political liberalism, and achieving reflective 
equilibrium by abandoning the belief that the protection of fetal life for its own sake 
is within the legitimate remit of the state. 
The viability of the latter, bullet-biting response depends crucially on whether 
public reason’s implications for other political issues are all found to be appropriate. 
As noted at the outset of this paper, the incompleteness objection has been raised in 
relation to a range of political controversies other than abortion. And it is certainly 
possible that some of these will likewise turn out to be cases in which public reason 
returns determinate but ethically questionable answers. This would increase the costs 
of the bullet-biting strategy, perhaps to an unacceptable degree. Whether there do 
indeed exist such other cases can only await further work. But it is worth highlighting 
at least one possibility, suggested by the discussion above in section 3.2. 
Jonathan Quong (2012a, pp. 273-87) and Micah Schwartzman (2004, pp. 201-
3) have argued that, on grounds of consistency, political liberals should accept that 
the use of public reason is mandatory not only in deliberations over fundamental 
political matters, as Rawls believed, but in all debates over citizens’ collective 
exercises of political power. On their view, political liberalism is committed to the 
position that respect for free and equal persons requires, quite generally, that they be 
governed in accordance with political principles and laws that can be justified in 
terms that they can reasonably accept - in which case it is arbitrary to exempt some 
exercises of political power from that test. Suppose Quong and Schwartzman are 
right. If so, it appears that the ethical objection can also powerfully be pressed with 
reference to the question of animal welfare. For as we have seen, the political values 
of public reason prescribe respect exclusively for political persons, and would 
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consequently yield, if applied to the latter question, the unpalatable conclusion that 
our treatment of nonhumans should be constrained only insofar as this would benefit 
us. 
The ethical objection focuses on the impediments to accepting Rawls’s theory 
of public justification, assessed in terms of the intuitions or considered judgements of 
political philosophers. A distinct objection emerges by considering the tension 
between public reason and the beliefs of reasonable citizens. According to Rawls, it is 
a desideratum of the answers to political questions reached in public reason that they 
lie ‘within the leeway’ allowed by citizens’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 
2005, p. 246). Those doctrines should, Rawls says, be able to ‘accept, even if 
reluctantly, the conclusions of public reason, either in general or in any particular 
case.’ The reason political liberalism hopes for this is that conspicuous or widespread 
conflicts between the determinations of public reason and citizens’ comprehensive 
doctrines would compromise the latter’s ability to affirm the deliberative primacy of 
the political values, or continue to abide by their duty of civility. In other words, such 
conflicts would undermine the prospects for a society’s becoming well-ordered by 
political liberal lights. Public reason’s implications in the case of abortion, however, 
are clearly in sharp tension with the moral worldviews of a high proportion of liberal 
citizens (both as we know them, and under foreseeable future conditions). And 
accordingly, a second available objection to public reason’s exclusion of fetus-
regarding moral considerations from political argument would be that the options for 
democratic advocacy which are thereby left open to citizens, and the collective 
decisions rendered most likely, will not be within the leeway allowed by most 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Call this the incongruity objection. Unlike the 
ethical objection, the incongruity objection holds that public reason is undermined 
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not from a perspective of external moral evaluation, but in its own terms. In common 
with the ethical objection, however, the incongruity objection will gain traction if 
there are other political questions to which public reason delivers problematic 
answers, and which place the commitment of citizens to the deliberative priority of 
the political values under further strain. 
So far I have focused on the fact that public reason is predisposed towards 
conclusions about abortion that are more permissive than most people’s moral beliefs 
will likely allow. But irrespective of the moral merits of the conclusions towards 
which public reason is weighted, the fact of its being so might plausibly be regarded 
as an objectionable dilution of the democratic ideal, whereby citizens debate and 
resolve issues of fundamental moral importance together. While the ethical and 
incongruity objections outlined above are (to my knowledge) largely unfamiliar, the 
criticism that too many determinations of public reason are fixed prior to actual 
deliberation, as a result of the philosophical restrictions imposed on its content, has a 
prominent place in the literature (see especially Habermas 1995, and Benhabib 2002, 
p. 108ff). In at least some cases, Rawlsians might plausibly respond to this objection 
with the claim that the content of public reason, as given by the family of political 
conceptions of justice, provides ample room for democratic disagreement (see, e.g., 
Quong 2013b). But that reply will not do in the case under discussion, since if my 
analysis has been correct the members of the family exhibit absolutely no diversity on 
the issue of prenatal moral status, on which the problem of abortion so centrally 
turns.  
The foregoing antidemocratic objection is not the only pre-existing objection to 
public reason that may get a new outing, or receive further augmentation, as a result 
of my argument. For instance, proponents of the so-called integrity objection (on which 
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see, e.g., Vallier 2014, pp. 57-66) will likely interject that to require citizens not to 
engage in the public forum on the basis of their beliefs about prenatal moral status, 
even when the abortion of very late-term fetuses is at issue, is to demand that they 
alienate themselves from their deepest moral convictions, thereby compromising 
their moral integrity, and harming them. Undoubtedly, further objections are also 
possible. I shall not attempt to catalogue them all, since I believe we have now made 
enough progress for one day. As we have seen, Rawlsian public reason carries 
implications for the question of abortion that are strikingly out of step with 
mainstream moral judgements and most citizens’ comprehensive doctrines, are likely 
to seriously test the loyalties of many citizens to their duty of civility, and are largely 
insulated against effective democratic challenge. Even if one thinks that these 
problems are not sufficient to warrant abandonment of the ideal of public reason, 
they are strikes against it. Determinacy, after all, is far from the only desideratum of a 
model of public reasoning. So the fact that the Rawlsian model does after all produce 
an answer on abortion is not enough to vindicate it. 
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